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ABSTRACT The idea of separating a person’s consciousness and transferring it to another
medium—'mind upload'—is being actively discussed in science, philosophy, and science
fiction. Mind upload technologies are currently also being developed by private companies in
Silicon Valley, and similar technological developments have received significant funding in the
EU. Mind upload has important existential and ethical implications, yet little is known about
how ordinary people actually feel about it. The current paper aims to provide a thorough
moral psychological evaluation about various cognitive factors that explain people’s feelings
and reactions towards the use of mind upload technology. In four studies (including pilot)
with a total of 952 participants, it was shown that biological and cultural cognitive factors
help to determine how strongly people condemn mind upload. Both experimental manip-
ulations in a laboratory and cross-sectional correlative online study designs were employed.
The results showed that people who value purity norms and have higher sexual disgust
sensitivity are more inclined to condemn mind upload. Furthermore, people who are anxious
about death and condemn suicidal acts were more accepting of mind upload. Finally, higher
science fiction literacy and/or hobbyism strongly predicted approval of mind upload. Several
possible confounding factors were ruled out, including personality, values, individual ten-
dencies towards rationality, and theory of mind capacities. Possible idiosyncrasies in the
stimulus materials (whether consciousness is uploaded onto a computer, chimpanzee, arti-
ficial brain, or android; and whether the person’s body physically dies during the process)
were ruled out. The core findings inform ongoing philosophical discussions on how mind
upload could (or should) be used in the future, and imply that mind upload is a much more
salient topic for the general population than previously thought.
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'Somehow [there was something] deeply disturbing: disgust
that arose from the conjunction of two ostensibly
irreconcilable systems of imagery, that of flesh and that of
machinery'
Mark O’Connell in 'To be a Machine' (p. 89), describing the
implementation of mind upload technologies
A lmost all human cultures throughout history seem to havedeveloped religious or moral sanctions and norms on howthe souls and spirits of people are allowed to transfer,
move, and operate in the world. Since ancient Egypt, humans
have certifiably been concerned with moral issues related to the
fate of their souls (Mark, 2016). How humans treated themselves
and others influenced the quality and the value of their souls: In
ancient Egyptian mythology the soul’s value (i.e., the heart) was
weighted against a feather in the Judgment hall of Osiris, before
entering afterlife (Mark, 2016).
Similar concerns were also later apparent in Greek mythology,
where souls, as well as living heroes, could end up in Hades/
Erebus if the mortals angered the Olympian gods. However, only
exceptional heroes could make their way back from the under-
world while most mortals and their souls could not. For example,
in book 11 of Odyssey (Homer and Rieu, 1959), Odysseus himself
participates in a rite of Nekyia to travel to the Underworld to
meet the spirit of Teiresias and to communicate with him about
returning home. Social concerns in earthly life were also apparent
in ancient Greek religions (McEvilley, 2002), particularly in
Orphism, where the purity of the soul influenced the trials that it
would go through in the afterlife (McEvilley, 2002; Petrovic and
Petrovic, 2016). In Plato’s writings the purity of the soul and
concerns regarding its development are discussed extensively
(McEvilley, 2002; Zeyl, 2009) either by Socrates in espousing his
philosophical arguments (Edmonds, 2015; e.g., Phaedo and
Republic); or when reflecting on the Orphic mystery cult (Parker,
1995).
Later on, the theological ideas about the soul were copied from
Neoplatonism (mediated through Judaism; Wright, 2009) to the
budding constructions of the Catholic canon; and under Chris-
tianity, moral concerns in the communal life governed the fate of
the individual’s soul (Carrier, 2014). In ancient India too, indi-
viduals’ social and moral lives were intertwined with their afterlife
narratives in Buddhism and in Hinduism (Jürgensmeyer and
Roof, 2011). These concerns about the soul are often connected
with norms governing ritualistic purity (Douglas, 1966); and the
norms and their upkeep, in turn, seem to be motivated by the
emotion of disgust (Rozin et al., 1999).1
In cognitive anthropology and evolutionary psychology, one of
the basic assumptions is that if some cultural phenomenon or
certain forms of socio-epistemic patterns ('memes' or 'social
representations') are universally—or near universally—found
across our globe and shared between ethnicities, there most likely
is a biological component involved (Boyer, 2001; Bering, 2006;
Moscovici, 2001; Tooby and Cosmides, 2005; see Sperber, 1996
for epidemiology of ideas). Indeed, anthropological evidence
suggests that moral beliefs and attitudes concerning souls could
pre-date even ancient Egypt (Wright, 2009; Frazer, 1922; Tylor,
1974; Durkheim, 1915). Most likely the cognitive mechanisms
involved here are those that relate to regulating communal living
boundaries (Wilson, 2002) and awareness of in-group norm
purity, disgust mechanisms (Curtis, 2013), as well as mechanisms
related to Theory of Mind capacities (Bering, 2006; Boyer, 2001).
Since the beginning of ethnographic research, evidence has
accumulated on hunter-gatherers and their varied conceptions of
souls and spirits (Eliade, 1964). According to Émile Durkheim
(1915), spirits can disparate from the bodies of witches during
night and commit crimes and mischief. If the witches are caught
they can be punished by the surrounding community. Anthro-
pologists studying Latin American shamanism have also reported
that it is common for shamans in these cultures to be feared,
because they reportedly have skills of traveling in the spirit world
and transforming into animals (Narby, 2005).
The mythological theme and narrative of individuals’ spirits
traveling to other worlds and into various other bodies or entities
is also found in Siberian shamanism (Anttonen, 1994), various
African tribes,!Kung San Bushmen, and various schools of Can-
domble (Johnson, 2002). Sometimes these spirit travels are
accepted, sanctioned, and even positively welcomed by the
communities; other times, in different alternative contexts, the
soul’s traveling into animals or different realms is forbidden,
feared, and only allowed for the experts, such as the local psy-
chopomps (Eliade, 1964; Anttonen, 1994; Boyer, 2001; Narby,
2005).
In summary, moral sanctioning and rule setting on how spirits
or souls are allowed to transfer, move, and operate in the world
has been a relatively universal phenomenon throughout human
history; as seems to be its connection to ritualistic aspects of
human social life (Douglas, 1966).
Cognitive science and developmental psychology have exten-
sively researched folk psychology and more or less established
that humans are so called intuitive substance dualists—we
instinctively separate mind from matter in our everyday lives
(Bering, 2006; Bloom, 2004). Furthermore, the fact that the fate of
the soul is very often connected to social issues and rules indicates
that human intuitive substance dualism has either been exapted
to serve social functions; or has some hitherto unrecognized
evolutionary pressures behind it (Wilson, 2002; Haidt, 2007).
Whether souls actually exist or not is not our primary concern;
but we (humans) nonetheless have intuitions about souls and
their ritual purity. Moreover, these purity intuitions regarding the
soul are almost universally animated by the emotion of disgust
(Bering, 2006; Haidt, 2006; Rozin et al., 1999; Douglas, 1966).
Intuitions about the soul are pervasive in modern times as well
(Bloom, 2004; Bering, 2006). The theme of soul transfer is visible
in modern contexts, such as tech-companies in Silicon Valley
promising to transfer our minds unto silicon-based mediums
(see2; and3), and postmodern contexts in science fiction films as
Chappie (2015) or Transcendence (2014). This perennial theme
in our history keeps gripping our imaginations and arresting our
attentions. Still, the science fiction-esque nature of these issues
makes some feel that this technology and the ethical concerns
related to it are not urgent or relevant for at least the next 20 years
or so (see Bostrom, 2014 for discussion). As a counterpoint, we
note that a copy of a C. elegans’ nervous system has already been
placed inside a robot4, and a functional copy of part of a rat’s
brain has been digitalized5. In both of these cases, the copy
functions similarly to the original. Due to the exponential
development speed of digital technologies (e.g., Bostrom, 2014;
Tegmark, 2017), we might be facing the actuality of these tech-
nologies sooner or later. Thus, we feel that an informed scientific
discussion regarding these matters is called for, well in advance.
However, modern research has not thoroughly investigated our
moral intuitions in conjunction with soul transfer. Recent studies
have explored the implications of perceiving artificial intelligences
(AIs) as moral agents, such as in the case of self-driving cars
(Bonnefon et al., 2016; Ward et al., 2013 a further preliminary
work suggests that theory of mind capacities might be involved in
moral cognition relating to AIs (Ward et al., 2013; Waytz et al.,
2010; Gray et al., 2012). Modern day information processing
technologies are complex and being constantly applied to new
areas of human action. Nonetheless, most areas of human
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behaviour involving moral decision making, such as rescue
operations, prioritizing medical cues or implementing life
extension technologies, have received little attention in experi-
mental philosophy and studies of moral cognition. We aim to
widen the scope of this new emerging field concerning the
morality of intelligent machines with our series of studies.
Robots and AIs are becoming more intelligent, autonomous
and capable. It is thus important to understand how our moral
cognition functions in interaction with them (Wallach and Allen,
2008). According to recent theoretical developments, it has been
suggested that modern AI technology is giving birth to a 'new
ontological category': social agents that are not alive, yet function
as if they were (Severson and Carlson, 2010). This might pose a
fundamental challenge for our stone-aged cognitive apparatus
that evolved during the Pleistocene era when inanimate objects
did not come to life and interact with us (Tooby and Cosmides,
2005). An example of this in modern societies is when humans
are treating their robot pets as if they were real pets (Melson et al.,
2009). In other words, robots and AIs are a new category that is
fundamentally at odds with our natural cognitive human cate-
gories (for discussion on natural categories, see Atran, 2002).
Therefore, human interaction with new technologies needs to be
investigated from a moral cognitive perspective, since autono-
mous moral agents or AMAs (Wallach and Allen, 2008) and
other forms of new technologies create unprecedented moral
dilemmas and situations that cannot be understood from the
perspective of old paradigms and theories. In a sense, we are
starting to operate in a world of moral zombies; how our 'tribal
monkey moral minds' (Haidt, 2012; Greene, 2014) interact with
new technologies is an intriguing scientific problem.
These issues are relevant not just for science fiction stories and
new budding forms of moral psychology. Recently, themes
relating to soul transfer or mind upload have received extensive
attention also in philosophy of science and philosophy of mind
(Cappuccio, 2017; Pigliucci, 2014; Chalmers, 2010). Mind upload
technologies are seriously discussed in a very detailed manner,
since the scientific and philosophical issues related to these
technologies sit elegantly at an epistemic hub between different
schools of thought in consciousness studies, as well as embodied
—and classical cognitive sciences (Cappuccio, 2017). These
technologies are being taken seriously enough to be investigated
by even The U.S. President’s Council on Bioethics, whose chair
Leon Kass condemned their development and use by openly
appealing to his emotion of disgust (see O’Connell, 2017, p. 37).
We therefore decided to investigate the connections between
these dualistic intuitions, disgust sensitivity and moral sanction-
ing of soul transfers within the post-modern cultural context.
More specifically, we evaluated how a wide array of individual
difference measures and situational factors influence moral con-
demnation in scenarios where a scientist uploads his mind
(consciousness) onto a computer (or other medium). We did not
have any specific hypotheses in the beginning; these studies were
purely exploratory. In this case, forming hypotheses based on pre-
existing theory should come after the phenomenon itself has been
investigated more carefully. However, gaining new knowledge in
our intuitions about mind upload deepens our understanding of
several different fields of inquiry. We will return to these issues in
the General Discussion section.
Data analyses
In all our studies, we analyzed our data using multiple regression
models. In other words, we employed several independent
(explanatory) variables to explain the variability within our
dependent (response) variable (DV; approval/disapproval of
mind upload technology). Multiple regression allows for
evaluating how a number of different independent variables
influence approval or disapproval of mind upload, while statis-
tically controlling for the effects of the individual variables. This
helps us deduce which of the independent variables are more
relevant than others in terms of statistical significance and effect
size. Across our studies we have constructed several multiple
regression models, progressively increasing the number of inde-
pendent variables, and then dropping the non-significant vari-
ables out (as per the principle of statistical parsimony).
Pilot study
The aims of the pilot study were to test our experimental para-
digm and dependent variables. However, we did also expect to
find a positive association between theory of mind (ToM) capa-
cities and condemnation of mind upload scenarios (Ward et al.,
2013). Furthermore, since the theme of uploading one’s con-
sciousness to a silicon-based medium is often discussed and
associated with 'rationality activists' clustering around the popular
blog LessWrong6 we included (as exploratory measures) two
scales assessing individual variation in tendencies towards
rationality.7 We also included the Moral Foundations Ques-
tionnaire (MFQ; Haidt and Graham, 2007), which is the most
widely used psychometric tool assessing individual differences in
moral preferences. Finally, we included measures on perceived
vulnerability to diseases (PVD; Duncan et al., 2009), because
some elements in our study vignettes (i.e., nano-machines) could
be perceived as alien disease vectors (for details, see the story
description below and Appendix SI Text 1 for the full version).
Another reason to include PVD was a recent study showing a
strong link between PVD and the MFQ Purity scale (Laakasuo
et al., 2017); the PVD scale might thus have relevance to moral
cognition in other contexts as well.
Method
Ethics statement. All local laws regarding ethics for social science
research were followed in full in all studies. All participation was
fully voluntary and participants were informed about their right
to opt out at any point without penalties. Materials used and a
study protocol were reviewed and approved by the University of
Helsinki Ethical Review Board in Humanities and Social and
Behavioural Sciences.
Participants and design. In total, 268 participants recruited
through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) successfully com-
pleted a correlational questionnaire prepared with Qualtrics (N=
268; 161 female; AgeM= 31.63; SD= 10.92; Range= 18–72). All
participants were US residents, and compensated US $1.50. The
median income of our participants was in the range of $40
000–45 000. Our participants reported their socio-economic
status level (SES) using an 9-point scale ladder indicating how
they felt they were positioned with respect to other Americans in
overall education, income, and status (M= 5.00, SD= 1.58). Of
our participants, 139 had obtained at least a Bachelor’s degree.
Research has shown that the quality of data gathered using
MTurk is of no less quality than studies ran in laboratory
environments (Horton et al., 2011; Paolacci et al., 2010).
Procedure and materials. Participants first gave informed consent
and then filled in scales in the following order: Reading the Mind
in The Eyes Task (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), MFQ (Haidt and
Graham, 2007), Three Domain Disgust Scale (Tybur et al., 2009),
Religiosity Scale (see description below) and Science Fiction
Hobbyism Scale (manuscript in preparation). Thereafter the
participants read a story about a scientist who successfully
transfers his consciousness (uploads his mind) onto a computer.
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The story was modeled after a description sketched by Hans
Moravec (1988).
In the story, the scientist injects himself with nano-machines
that enter his brain and substitute his neurons one-by-one. After
a neuron has been substituted, the functioning of that neuron is
copied (uploaded) on a computer; and after each neuron has been
copied/uploaded the nano-machines shut down, and the
scientist’s body falls on the ground completely limp. Finally, the
scientist wakes up inside the computer.
After reading the story the participants responded to the
dependent variables, which were shown on the same page as the
story (the participants could refer back to the story if needed).
Finally, the participants answered demographic and other
background questions, and were debriefed and thanked.
Reading the mind in the eyes (RMET) task. This task was devel-
oped by Baron-Cohen and colleagues (2001), and is usually
employed as a measure of individual ToM capacity. ToM capacity
predicts empathetic behaviour and the ability to take another
person’s perspective. The task consists of 32 close-up pictures of
people’s eyes portraying an emotion. Participants are given four
options of emotion words to choose from, only one of which is
the one that actually corresponds to the emotional tone of the
eyes. Higher scores indicate higher theory of mind capacity, or
empathizing ability (the scores also work as a performance
measure of emotional intelligence).
Perceived vulnerability to diseases (PVD). The PVD scale mea-
sures individual differences in disease sensitivity (Duncan et al.,
2009), and has two sub-scales: Perceived Infectability and Germ
Aversion. Both sub-scales ask participants to rate how well a set
of sentences describes them, on a scale from '1' (not at all) to '7'
(very well). Perceived Infectability correlates with health-related
anxieties and hypochondria. It is related to future fears of being ill
and is specific to infectious diseases, but not to current or past
health concerns (Duncan et al., 2009). It correlates with rational
beliefs and predictions related to pathogens. For instance, indi-
viduals with immune system deficiencies (e.g., the elderly) typi-
cally score high on the scale. An example item is: 'If an illness is
“going around”, I will get it'. The scale has three reverse coded
items (e.g., 'My immune system protects me from most illnesses
that other people get.'). The Perceived Infectability sub-scale had
good internal reliability (7 items, α= .90). Higher scores indicate
higher perceived infectability.
Germ Aversion measures individual anxiety related to situa-
tions with elevated risk of pathogen transmission. The scale
correlates with disgust sensitivity and is related to intuitive
assessment of perceived risks of contracting a disease in social
settings. Individuals with high germ aversion intuitively avoid
people with morphological abnormalities. An example item is: 'It
really bothers me when people sneeze without covering their
mouths'. The scale has three reverse coded items (e.g., 'My hands
do not feel dirty after touching money.'), and had a satisfactory
internal reliability in our sample (8 items, α= .79). Higher scores
indicate higher germ aversion.
Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). The MFQ measures
individual variation in the foundations of 'intuitive ethics' (Gra-
ham et al., 2011). It is based on a model for five separate moral
foundations: care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal,
authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation. The MFQ has
two parts. In the first part, the respondent is asked to rate how
relevant various considerations (16 in total) are when deciding
whether something is right or wrong, on a scale from '1' (not at all
relevant) to '7' (extremely relevant). Example items are 'Whether
or not someone suffered emotionally' (care/harm), and 'Whether
or not someone violated standards of purity and decency'
(sanctity/degradation). In the second part, the respondent rates
his/her agreement with 16 statements on a scale from '1' (strongly
disagree) to '7' (strongly agree). Example items are 'Compassion
for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue' (care/harm),
and 'Chastity is an important and valuable virtue' (sanctity/
degradation). High (or low) scores on specific sub-scales indicate
high (or low) relevance for said sub-scale in an individual’s
intuitive moral foundation or 'code of conduct'. The Cronbach’s
alpha values for all sub-scales were .69 for harm/care, .64 for
fairness/cheating, .73 for loyalty/betrayal, .73 for authority/sub-
version and .80 for purity/sanctity.
Science Fiction Hobbyism Scale. This scale is currently under
development. It consists of 12 items and measures individuals’
cultural exposure to various science fiction themes. It has items
such as 'I consider myself a major consumer of science fiction'
and 'I think science fiction is an interesting topic'. All the ques-
tions were anchored from '1' (strongly disagree) to '7' (strongly
agree). Higher scores indicate higher science fiction hobbyism
and exposure to science fiction themes. In the current sample, the
scale had good psychometric properties (all factor loadings > .57;
Cronbach’s alpha= .92). For full statistics and a listing of the
scale items, see Appendix Tables A5-A8.
Religiosity Scale. We created this scale by compiling together 15
items. The scale measures individual differences in level of per-
sonal religious practice and commitment (see Appendix for
detailed psychometric validation). Participants were shown
statements and asked to evaluate their importance in their lives
on a scale from '1' (not at all important) to '7' (very important).
Example items are: 'Praying regularly' or 'Belonging to church or
some other religious persuasion'. The scale had excellent internal
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha= .96). Higher scores indicate
higher levels of religiosity (for full listing of items and further
psychometric analyses, see Appendix Tables A9-A11).
Rational-experiential inventory (REI). The REI measures indivi-
dual dispositions in two distinct thinking styles (Pacini and
Epstein, 1999). The questionnaire consists of two orthogonal sub-
scales labelled Rational and Experiential. Both sub-scales have 20
items and had excellent internal consistencies in our sample
(Cronbach’s alphas= .91 and .93 for Rational and Experiential,
respectively). All items were anchored from '1' (strongly disagree)
to '7' (strongly agree). The Rational sub-scale measures engage-
ment in and enjoyment of cognitive activities, with higher scores
indicating greater engagement and enjoyment. The Experiential
sub-scale is the 'intuitive' counterpart of the Rational sub-scale,
and measures faith in and reliance on initial impressions, with
higher scores indicating greater faith and reliance. The REI has
such items as 'I have no problem thinking things through care-
fully' (Rational) and 'I like to rely on my intuitive impressions'
(Experiential). About half of the items in both sub-scales are
reverse-coded, including 'Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable
activity' (Rational) and 'If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I
would often make mistakes' (Experiential).
Dependent variable/disapproval of mind upload. Our dependent
variable consisted of 10 items, which were averaged together.
Eight of the items were anchored from '1' (completely disagree) to
'7' (completely agree), for example: 'I found the scientist’s actions
to be irresponsible' and 'What the scientist did should be illegal'.
One of these eight items was reverse coded (The scientist who
makes progress in developing technologies like this should be
rewarded). Two items were anchored from '1' (not at all) to '7'
(very much): 'How immoral did you find the scientist’s actions to
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be?' and 'How acceptable did you find the scientist’s actions to
be?'. The DV had a strong single factor structure and acceptable
internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha= .89). Higher scores
indicate higher rates of disapproval of mind upload technologies
(for full details of the items and psychometric analyses in our
pilot study see the Appendix Tables A1-A4).
Pilot study Results. We ran a multiple regression analysis by first
building a baseline model with age and gender as covariates; and
then sequentially adding covariates as follows. Second model:
level of education and socioeconomic status. Third model: Reli-
giosity Scale and Science Fiction Hobbyism scale. Fourth model:
Reading the Mind in the Eyes task. Fifth model: Moral Founda-
tions Questionnaire as a whole. Finally, in the sixth and seventh
models we sequentially dropped all non-significant covariates (for
full statistics see Table 1).
Our results suggest that cultural factors play a significant role
in understanding the condemnation of mind upload: the scales
measuring religiosity and science fiction hobbyism were strong
predictors of disapproval and approval of mind upload,
respectively (Models 3–7). Interestingly, level of education, SES,
gender, and the RMET were not associated with condemning the
scientist’s actions in the story.
Surprisingly, two sub-scales from the MFQ were associated
with approval and disapproval of the events described in the story
(Fairness and Purity; Model 5). However, after removing non-
significant variables from the analysis, only Purity remained
statistically significant (together with science fiction hobbyism
and religiosity; Models 5–7).
Additional pilot study analyses. Laakasuo et al. (2017) suggested
that the PVD scale produces similar results in intergroup
altruistic helping situations than the MFQ Purity sub-scale. In our
exploratory analysis we entered both of the PVD sub-scales into
the same analysis (see Table 1, Model 7); however neither of the
PVD sub-scales were statistically significant predictors (Bs < 0.1, |
t| < 1.2, ps= n.s.). This suggests that, in the story, the nano-
machines being injected in the scientist’s bloodstream were not
considered as disease vectors by our participants, and that in this
context PVD has no relevance for moral cognition.
Some visible advocates for mind upload technologies are
clustered around a popular online community called LessWrong
(www.lesswrong.com). In this community the main focus point is
in increasing the potential for human rationality and rational
action. We therefore evaluated whether or not the approval of
mind upload technology is related to individual differences in
rationality-related thinking styles. We entered both REI8 scales
into the analysis without any other variables, but only the
Rationality sub-scale was statistically significant (B=−0.19, 95%
CI [−0.34, −0.04], p= .01). Further probing, however, revealed
that the effect disappeared after entering the MFQ Purity variable
into the analysis. This analysis suggests that rationality does play
a role in adopting a positive attitude towards mind upload
technology, but the effects are probably dependent on deeper
cognitive structures associated with Purity orientations, which, in
turn, are associated with the emotion of disgust. Thus, low levels
of individual disgust sensitivity—instead of high levels of rational
thought—might explain the approval of mind upload (see Studies
2 and 3).
Pilot study Discussion. The results of our pilot study indicate
that the stimulus material is appropriate to study condemnation
of mind upload. Higher religiosity was associated with higher
levels of condemnation, whereas higher levels of science fiction
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with higher levels of acceptance of mind upload technology, when
both variables were included in the same model simultaneously.
The central implications of the Pilot Study are: (1) cultural
factors seem to be very important for the formation of attitudes
related to the approval or disapproval of mind upload technology,
and (2) given the independent link between condemnation of
mind upload and MFQ Purity, even after controlling for
religiosity and science fiction hobbyism, the emotion of disgust
might also be implicated in the current setting. MFQ Purity has
been associated with the emotion of disgust in several recent
studies (Laakasuo et al., 2017; Chapman and Anderson, 2014),
and it is consistently associated with moral concerns in other
domains as well. However, our exploratory analysis seems to
imply that these attitudes for condemning mind upload are not
related to pathogen components of disgust (PVD), but possibly to
more abstract forms of disgust sensitivity; we return to this
question in Study 2. The results also alluded to a link between the
MFQ Fairness-Reciprocity sub-scale and condemnation of mind
upload; however, we could not replicate this effect (see
subsequent Studies) and therefore concluded it was probably a
false positive (there were 12 variables included in the analysis, and
the probability of finding at least one false positive, with the p
= .05 criterion, is 1–0.95^12= ~46% while the expected number
of false positives with 12 variables is 0.05*12= 0.6).
Surprisingly, there were no associations between RMET scores
and condemnation of mind upload. This implies that while ToM
capacities might be necessary for us to form intuitions about souls
and spirits, ToM alone is unrelated to the moral condemnation of
uploading one’s mind onto a different platform (for similar
findings in context of supernatural beliefs, see Lindeman et al.,
2015).
Study 1
After establishing the basic functionality of our vignette, study
design and variables in an American Mturk sample, we sought to
examine situational factors in mind upload scenarios in a
laboratory experiment in Finland. Previous studies have estab-
lished that people very easily dehumanize others who are different
and associate them with less than human qualities (Haslam and
Loughnan, 2014). Thus, perhaps the nature of the “target”, where
the scientist’s consciousness was uploaded to, would explain some
variance in people’s attitudes towards mind upload technologies.
We modified our original vignette by changing the target of mind
upload to be either (1) a computer, (2) an android body, (3) a
chimpanzee, or (4) an artificial brain. We reasoned that since
similarity breeds familiarity, which, in turn, breeds acceptance,
there could be more tolerance for transferring one’s conscious-
ness to an android body or to a chimpanzee compared with
artificial brains or a computer.
In this study we also sought to explore whether fundamental
personality factors in the HEXACO model of personality (Ashton
and Lee, 2007, 2009; Lee and Ashton, 2004) or Schwartz’s value
orientations (Schwartz, 2003) play a role in condemning mind
upload.
Method
Participants and design. In total, 160 (N= 160; 73 female) par-
ticipants (AgeM= 39.76; SD= 15.18; Range= 18–75) were
recruited from a large public library in the city of Espoo and told
they could participate in a study taking about 35 min of their
time. Of the participants, 97 had at least a Bachelor’s degree.
After a non-intrusive recruitment procedure (see below) the
participant was escorted into our 'pop-up' laboratory located in
the library. The participant then sat in front of a laptop computer,
which randomized him/her into one of four conditions (the
experimenters were blind to the randomization): The scientist in
the story uploaded his mind into either (1) a computer, (2) an
android body, (3) chimpanzee or (4) an artificial brain. As
compensation, the participants were offered a chance to
participate in a lottery for movie tickets (worth 24 × 10€).
Procedure and materials. The data were gathered in a large public
library in the Helsinki Metropolitan area. Participant recruitment
was non-invasive: We had positioned a desk in the foyer area of
the library, along with a sign stating: 'Participate in Psychological
Research'. Research assistants dressed in neutral ordinary clothing
sat behind the desk. All recruited participants approached our
research assistants voluntarily. After making sure the participant
was over 18 years old, they were given an informed consent form,
telling them about the general purpose of the study and their right
to opt-out at any point. After giving their signed consent, the
participants were escorted into a laboratory space specifically set
up for the purposes of this study.
The laboratory had four laptop computers with 15” screens
positioned in a way that guaranteed maximum privacy. The
laboratory space was divided by office walls, and participants
were instructed to use headphones playing pink noise to cover up
any possible distracting noise. The pink noise volume was held
constant at a pleasant level. The experiment was programmed
using Python’s Social Psychology Questionnaire library (Laaka-
suo, in preparation), which is built on top of Pygame version 1.96.
The experiment itself started by randomizing the participant
into one of the four conditions listed previously. Both the
experimenters and participants were blind to the randomization.
Participants first filled in the HEXACO and Schwartz’s Value
scales, after which they proceeded to fill in the same Science
Fiction Hobbyism and Religiosity scales used in the Pilot Study.
Finally, the participants read one of the four vignettes/stories,
where the scientist transfers his consciousness into either (1) a
computer, (2) an android body, (3) chimpanzee or (4) an artificial
brain. In all other respects, the story was identical to the one
presented in the Pilot Study. After reading the story, the
participants gave their responses to the dependent variables and
demographic variables. Finally, they were debriefed and thanked
by the research assistants.
HEXACO-60 personality inventory. We used the HEXACO-PI-R
(also known as HEXACO-60; Ashton and Lee, 2009) to assess
personality. HEXACO is a six-dimensional instrument with very
good psychometric properties in personality assessment (Lee and
Ashton, 2004; Ashton and Lee, 2007). It is highly similar to the
Big Five or Five Factor Model constructs, with the exception of
having an additional dimension labeled 'Honesty-Humility'. The
Honesty-Humility dimension measures individual lack of interest
in manipulating others for personal gain, and disinterest in status
symbols and/or luxurious life style (Cronbach’s alpha= .77). The
other dimensions of HEXACO are Emotionality (Cronbach’s
alpha= .73), the tendency to experience fear, anxiety, and need of
assurance; eXtroversion (Cronbach’s alpha= .82), the tendency
to experience positive feelings of enthusiasm and energy; Agree-
ableness (Cronbach’s alpha= .76), the tendency to be forgiving,
lenient, flexible and patient; Conscientiousness (Cronbach’s
alpha= .70), the tendency to stay organized, control one’s
impulses and aspire for perfection; and Openness to Experience
(Cronbach’s alpha= .78), the tendency to be creative, curious,
imaginative and appreciative of aesthetics. All items were
anchored from '1' (strongly disagree) to '7' (strongly agree).
Schwartz’s value inventory. We used the Portrait Values Ques-
tionnaire with 21 items (PVQ-21) as used in the European Social
Survey, which measures ten basic values, e.g., Power,
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Universalism and Hedonism (Schwartz, 2003). Each item
describes a person in terms of what is important to them (him or
her; sample item for the value Self-Direction: 'Thinking up new
ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things
in her own original way'). Respondents reveal their own values
indirectly by indicating how much the person in each item is
similar to them, from '1' (not at all like me) to '6' (very much like
me). Individuals’ scores for the importance of each value are their
mean responses to the relevant items. Cronbach’s alphas for the
different basic values in different societies typically range from .30
to .80 and for the aggregate higher-order values from .65 to .80.
Religiosity Scale. We used the same version of the scale as in the
Pilot Study, with the exception of removing two items (Reversed-
Heywood cases in exploratory factor analysis that explained 0% of
the variance). The remaining 13 items, however, had a very good
inter-item reliability (Cronbach’s alpha= .92; see Appendix Table
A10 for further details).
Science Fiction Hobbyism Scale. This scale was identical to that
used in the Pilot Study. In Study 1, the scale had a very good
inter-item reliability as well (Cronbach’s alpha= .92; see
Appendix Table A6 for more psychometric analyses).
Dependent variable / approval of mind upload. Our dependent
variable had nine items that were averaged together. Example
items are: 'The scientist acted in a morally correct fashion' and
'There was nothing wrong with the scientist’s actions'. Four items
were reverse coded (e.g., 'The scientist should be punished for
what he did'). The DV had a strong single factor structure and a
good Cronbach’s alpha (.89; for full listing of items and psy-
chometric analyses, see the Appendix Table A2). Higher (or
lower) scores indicate higher rates of approval (or disapproval) of
the actions of the scientist, that is mind upload. Note that in the
Pilot Study, higher scores indicated higher rates of disapproval.
The difference in coding is due to issues of translating the DVs
from English to Finnish.
Study 1 Results. One-way ANOVA showed that the experimental
manipulation had no effect (F(3, 156)= 1.45, p= n.s.), indicating
that the target of mind upload is irrelevant for condemning or not
condemning the scientist’s actions. We then continued by run-
ning a regression analysis with just the HEXACO personality
dimensions and there were no significant associations with our
DV (all |t|s < 1.65, ps= n.s.). We also ran a regression analysis
with just Schwartz’s value dimensions, finding that only the
values of traditionalism were statistically significant (B=−0.29,
95% CI [−0.51, −0.07])9
Thereafter we ran a multiple regression analysis similar to the
one used in our Pilot Study (see Table 2 for full statistics). We
first built a baseline model with age and gender as covariates; and
then sequentially added covariates as follows. Second model: level
of education and income. Third model: Religiosity Scale and
Science Fiction Hobbyism scale. Fourth model: Moral Founda-
tions Questionnaire as a whole. In the fifth and sixth models, we
dropped all non-significant variables and added Schwartz’s
Traditionality, which however, was not significant.
The results of Study 1 suggest that, like in the Pilot Study, age is
an explaining factor in condemning the scientist’s actions, but
only until the model is controlled for the MFQ variables.
Furthermore, the gender effect, which was observed in this study
(Models 1–2; Table 2) but not in the Pilot Study (sampled in a US
population), disappeared after controlling for religiosity and
science fiction hobbyism (Model 3; Table 2). We probed this
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0124-6 ARTICLE
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS |  (2018) 4:84 | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0124-6 | www.nature.com/palcomms 7
controlling for science fiction hobbyism, but not after controlling
merely for religiosity. Thus, Finnish men and women are equally
accepting / condemning of mind upload scenarios, but only if
their cultural exposure to science fiction is held constant.
The effect of religiosity observed in the Pilot Study (Models
3–7; Table 1) was not observed in Study 1 (Table 2), where the
effect disappeared after the MFQ variables were entered into the
model. We further observed that the effect of religiosity was
mediated by the MFQ sub-scales Authority and Purity. Most
interestingly and most importantly, the effects of Science Fiction
Hobbyism and Purity were consistently replicated in Study 1:
Purity was associated with condemning mind upload, while
Science Fiction Hobbyism in turn, was associated with approving
mind upload—even when both variables along with religiosity
were simultaneously present in the model.
Study 1 Discussion. Study 1 successfully replicated the main
findings of our Pilot Study: Science Fiction Hobbyism was
strongly associated with approval of mind upload technology and
MFQ Purity orientation with condemning it. Furthermore, the
results of Study 1 suggest that what really matters in terms of
moral condemnation is the act of mind transfer—and not where
the mind is transferred to. We also found a link between con-
demnation and the MFQ sub-scale Authority-Respect; but this
finding could not be replicated in our subsequent Studies, and
thus we concluded it was probably a false positive.
Furthermore, the effects of religiosity observed in the US
sample were not replicated in the Finnish sample. This is not
surprising considering US is among the most religious western
countries, whereas Finland is among the most secular and
atheistic ones. It seems prima facie that religion and religiousness
have dissimilar meanings for Finns and Americans. However,
considering that Purity orientation was triggered similarly in
these two different samples with two culturally different
populations, it is possible that the stimulus materials themselves
trigger disgust reactions. According to Rozin et al. (1999), disgust
is related to so-called body-envelope violations (see also Douglas,
1966), and indeed, in our story the nano-machines are injected
into the bloodstream of the scientist. To rule out this possible
idiosyncrasy as a confounding factor, we decided to replicate the
study by altering the story (Study 2). Furthermore, according to
Haidt and Graham (2007) and Rozin and colleagues (1999),
purity concerns are associated with both the emotion of disgust
and epistemic structures surrounding the perceived fate of the
human soul (see also Horberg et al., 2009). This claim has also
empirical backing: people with high levels of purity orientation
are more likely to condemn suicides (Rottman et al., 2014). Thus,
in our next Study, we decided to accommodate for this possible
confound as well.
Study 1 also allowed us to rule out the effects of personality
traits (Ashton and Lee, 2007, 2009) and value orientations
(Schwartz, 2007; Myyry et al., 2009) on moral condemnation in
our context. However, the fact that Honesty-Humility and other
personality factors were unrelated to condemning mind upload
was surprising, since at least the Honesty-Humility -factor has
previously been linked to many recent findings in moral
psychology (de Vries et al., 2017; Djeriouat and Trémolière,
2014).
Study 2
Study 2 was designed to rule out possible confounds in our sti-
mulus materials and to control for individual differences in
sensitivity towards death anxiety and condemnation of suicide. In
the first version of our vignette, the scientist uses a needle to inject
nano-machines into his bloodstream (this is a body-envelope
violation and a possible disgust trigger; Rozin et al., 1999), after
which his body falls to the ground completely limp, leaving it
open whether he actually 'physically' dies or not (possible suicide
confound, see Rottman et al., 2014). We changed the story in a
manner that the scientist merely ingests the nano-machines in a
capsule form. Furthermore, we used a 2 × 2 experimental set-up
to investigate whether the body dying on a physical level [heart
stops or the brain stops] impacts the condemnation of the sci-
entist’s actions. We also investigated whether giving participants
information on how the transformation feels for the scientist once
he is in the new platform has an impact on the results. We
reasoned that information about the feelings associated with the
transfer would make it salient that the scientist is, in fact, still
alive after the transfer.
Since in our previous Studies we replicated Purity effects in two
culturally different samples, we also wanted to explore the pos-
sibility that there is a deeper and more biological disgust com-
ponent involved. To this end, in Study 2 we included the Three
Domain Disgust Scale (TDDS; Tybur et al., 2009), given its strong
ties to biology and evolutionary psychology. Furthermore, in a
recent study, Laakasuo et al. (2017) showed that two of the three
sub-components of TDDS are associated with deontological
moral attitudes in different ways: pathogen disgust is associated
with more utilitarian attitudes and sexual disgust with more
deontological attitudes (whereas moral disgust was not associated
with moral cognition at all; see also Laakasuo and Sundvall,
2016). Given this link between Sexual Disgust and deontological
moral attitudes, we expected to find a similar link between Sexual
Disgust and moral condemnation of mind upload. To sum up, in
Study 2 we aimed to disentangle several confounds and probe
deeper into possible explanatory biological and cultural factors.
Method
Participants and design. In total, 221 participants (N= 221; 114
female; AgeM= 38.65; SD= 16.84; Range= 18–80) were recrui-
ted in the same location and using the same procedure as in Study
1. In Study 2, participants were offered 2.5€ for their
participation.
After a non-intrusive recruitment procedure, the participants
were escorted into our 'pop-up' laboratory located in the library
(see Study 1 procedures). The participants then sat in front of a
laptop computer, which randomized them into one of four
conditions in a 2 × 2 factorial design (the experimenters were
blind to the randomization).
Procedure and materials. We used the same procedure and soft-
ware as in Study 1. The experiment in Study 2 started by ran-
domizing the participant into one of four conditions. First, the
participants filled in the Death Anxiety and Suicide Condemna-
tion scales, after which they proceeded to fill in the same Science
Fiction Hobbyism and Religiosity scales used in our previous
Studies.
Next, participants read one of four vignettes, where the
scientist transfers his consciousness onto a computer. As a result
of this transfer, either the scientist’s (1) brain activity stopped but
his heart kept beating, or (2) both brain and heart activity ceased
(first factor with two levels). The feelings of the scientist following
the transfer were either (3) described or (4) not described (second
factor with two levels). The story was otherwise identical to the
one presented in the Pilot Study, with the exception that rather
than injecting nano-machines into his body, the scientist ingests
them in a capsule form. After reading the story, the participants
responded to the dependent variables and demographic ques-
tions. Finally, they were debriefed and thanked by the research
assistants.
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Three Domain Disgust Scale. This scale was created by Tybur and
colleagues (2009) based on an evolutionary theoretical frame-
work. The scale has 21 items and measures three different aspects
of disgust sensitivity. The items are divided into three sub-scales
of 7 items each, labeled (1) Moral Disgust, (2) Sexual Disgust and
(3) Pathogen Disgust. Participants are instructed to think about
how disgusted they would feel by specific statements. The items
are anchored from '1' (not at all disgusting) to '7' (very disgust-
ing). Example items for Moral, Sexual and Pathogen disgust,
respectively, are: (1) 'Shoplifting a candy bar from a convenience
store'; (2) 'Hearing two strangers having sex'; (3) 'Stepping on dog
poop'. Higher scores on all of the sub-scales indicate pronounced
disgust sensitivity. There are no reverse coded items. The sub-
scale specific Cronbach’s alpha values were .88, .83 and .83 for
Moral Disgust, Sexual Disgust, and Pathogen Disgust,
respectively.
The Death Anxiety Scale. This scale was developed by Templer
and Ruff (1971), and it correlates strongly with anxiety disorders
as well as other measures of fear of death. The original scale
prompted dichotomous 'True / False' responses to 15 statements
regarding death and dying. However, for statistical purposes, we
anchored each item from '1' (strongly disagree) to '7' (strongly
agree), and removed 8 of the original items to dampen possible
mortality salience primes. The Cronbach’s alpha value for our
modified scale was .72. Example items are 'I fear dying a painful
death.' and 'The thought of death seldom enters my mind'
(reverse coded).
Suicide condemnation measure. We used a shorted four-item
version of the Attitudes Towards Suicide Permissiveness sub-scale
(Renberg and Jacobsson, 2003; Arnautovska and Grad, 2010) to
avoid strong depression-related primes. The items we used were:
(1) 'Suicide should be accepted as a solution to end an incurable
suffering'; (2) There are situations where the only rational solu-
tion is suicide'; (3) 'I would consider the possibility of taking my
own life if I were to suffer from a severe, incurable disease'; and
(4) 'People should have the right to take their own lives'. All the
items were anchored from '1' (strongly disagree) to '7' (strongly
agree) and were averaged together such as higher scores indicate
higher approval of suicide. The Cronbach’s alpha value for this
scale was .86.
Science Fiction Hobbyism Scale. In the current Study, Cronbach’s
alpha was .89 (see Pilot Study 1 for full description).
Religiosity Scale. In the current Study, Cronbach’s alpha was .91
(see Study 1 for full description).
Dependent variable/approval of mind upload measure. The scale
was identical to the one used in Study 1 (Cronbach’s alpha= .91;
for more detailed psychometrics and item descriptions see
Appendix Table A3). Higher scores indicate higher approval of
the scientist’s actions, that is, mind upload.
Study 2 Results. Two-way ANOVA showed that neither of the
experimental manipulations had statistically significant effects on
our DV (all Fs < 1 and all ps= n.s.). This suggests that whether
the body of the scientist dies 'partially' (brain activity ceases but
heart keeps beating) or 'fully' (brain activity ceases and heart stops
beating), or whether the feelings of the scientist after the mind
upload are made salient, was irrelevant with respect to the par-
ticipants’ condemning of the scientist’s actions. We then con-
tinued with a multiple regression similar to the one we conducted
in our previous Studies (for full statistics see Table 3), ignoring
the experimental structure of the data.
We again started by entering age and gender into a baseline
model, and sequentially added further covariates as follows.
Second model: Science Fiction Hobbyism scale. Third model:
Suicide Condemnation and Death Anxiety scales. Fourth model:
Moral Foundations Questionnaire as a whole. Fifth model:
Dropped all non-significant variables. Sixth and seventh models:
Added the Three Domain Disgust scales.
The results of Study 2 again show that gender differences in
approval of mind upload scenarios depend on science fiction
hobbyism (Models 1–2; Table 3). Furthermore, both Death
Anxiety and Suicide Condemnation were associated with
increased approval of mind upload (Model 3; Table 3). This
suggests that mind upload is not seen as a form of suicide—this is
the exact opposite of what could have been expected based on
previous research (Rottman et al., 2014).
After controlling for the MFQ variables, only Death Anxiety
remained statistically significant (Model 4; Table 3); in this model
Purity and Harm-Care were the only significant MFQ sub-scales.
After removing non-significant variables from the analysis
(Model 5; Table 3), Purity and Harm-Care remained significant.
After adding the Three Domain Disgust scale as a predictor
(Models 5–7; Table 3), only the Sexual Disgust sub-scale, along
with Purity and Harm-Care, were statistically significant in
predicting the condemnation of mind upload. Thus, two different
types of constructs associated with disgust (purity concerns and
sexual disgust) were linked to condemnation of mind upload
independently of one-another.
The results of Study 2 were consistent with our previous
Studies despite the differences in the mind upload vignettes
(scientist ingesting a capsule in Study 2 vs. injecting a needle in
the previous Studies). We also asked participants how disgusting
or “dirty” they felt the scientist’s actions were, on a scale from 1
(not at all) to 7 (very). Across our Studies the mean values (SD in
brackets) for these measures ranged between 2.9 (1.7; Pilot Study)
and 2.7 (1.8; Study 2), indicating that there were only minor
differences in disgust-ratings between the two vignettes (needle
vs. ingestion). This suggests that the “needle” version of the story
did not elicit disgust to an extent that would have explained the
results.
Study 2 Discussion. The results of Study 2 show that con-
demnation of the use of mind upload technology is not related to
either condemnation of suicide or to the potentially disgust-
eliciting element of needle-injection in our previous vignettes.
Both suicide condemnation and death anxiety were linked to
approval of mind upload; thus, uploading one’s mind onto a
computer is most likely not viewed as 'death' or 'dying'. Instead,
the results suggest that mind upload is seen more as a way of life-
extension than death of one’s previous body (or soul); both scales
measuring anxiety for death and suicide condemnation were
associated with more approval of mind upload technology.
We have now consistently observed the effects of Purity and
Science Fiction Hobbyism in three independent studies. In Study
2, also Sexual Disgust predicted condemning mind upload even
after controlling for the effects of science fiction hobbyism and
purity. This finding is in line with previous research linking
sexual disgust to utilitarian and deontological judgements
(Laakasuo et al., 2017). We also replicated the effect of the
MFQ Harm-Care sub-scale; this effect, however, was absent in the
US data (Pilot Study), and not replicated in Study 3, leading us to
conclude it was probably a false positive. As our final step in the
current set of studies, we sought to replicate the main effects of
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Study 2 with a larger and more varied sample to ascertain the
effects found for Sexual Disgust were not a false positive.
Study 3
The main aim of Study 3 was to replicate the effects of Sexual
Disgust and Purity in a different population, and to gain more
confidence in the general pattern of results found across our
previous laboratory studies. Study 3 was an online correlational
study sent out to several Finnish student associations throughout
the country.
Method
Participants and design. In total, 391 respondents opened the first
page of a correlational Internet questionnaire and 303 (N= 303;
221 female) completed the questionnaire adequately. Participants
were on average 25.7 years old (SD= 5.38; Range= 19–55) and
were recruited with emails sent to several university student
associations located across Finland. Participants were offered a
chance to enter their email address on a separate form to parti-
cipate in a movie ticket raffle (50 × 10€).
Procedure and materials. After giving informed consent, the
participants filled in the Three Domain Disgust scale, Science
Fiction Hobbyism Scale and the Moral Foundations Ques-
tionnaire. Subsequently, they read the same science fiction story
as in Study 2 and gave their responses to the dependent variables.
Finally, they were debriefed and offered the option of entering
their email addresses on a separate form if they wanted to par-
ticipate in a raffle for movie tickets. There were missing values for
two participants in our DV and the MFQ Purity sub-scale. These
missing values were imputed using STATA 13’s multinormal
distribution imputation strategy (for detailed descriptions of the
materials see Studies 1 and 2.)
Study 3 Results. We ran a regression analysis by first entering the
MFQ Purity and Harm-Care, and the Science Fiction Hobbyism
Scale into the model at the same time (R²= .09, F(3, 299)= 9.98,
p < .001). Consistent with our previous Studies, the effects of
Purity (B=−0.21, 95% CI [−0.35, −0.07], p < . 01) and Science
Fiction Hobbyism (B= 0.22, 95% CI [0.10, 0.34], p < .001) were
successfully replicated and statistically significant predictors of
our DV. However, the effects of harm–care were not replicated
(B=−0.08, 95% CI [−0.22, 0.06], p= n.s.). We thus dropped the
harm–care sub-scale from the analysis and added the Sexual
Disgust sub-scale into the model. In this final model (R²= .09, F
(3, 299)= 9.98, p < .001), all three variables were statistically
significant at the same time: Purity: (B=−0.14, 95% CI [−0.28,
−0.00], p < .05); Science Fiction Hobbyism: (B= 0.21, 95% CI
[0.10, 0.33], p < .001); TDDS Sexual Disgust: (B=−0.17, 95% CI
[−0.28, −0.05], p < .01). Both Purity and Sexual Disgust were
separately related to the condemnation of mind upload, whereas
Science Fiction Hobbyism predicted its approval.
Study 3 Discussion. In Study 3, we successfully replicated the
effects of Sexual Disgust and MFQ Purity, as both predicted
negative judgments or condemnation of the use of mind upload
technology while controlling for each other’s effects. Further-
more, we did not replicate the effects of MFQ harm–care, which
suggests that the effect found in our previous Studies is likely to
be a false positive. It is also possible that these effects were not
replicated due to more “noisy data” collected online.
General Discussion
Across four studies, we consistently showed that Purity orienta-
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Graham, 2007; Koleva et al., 2012) is positively associated with
condemnation of the act of transferring one’s consciousness onto
a new object (in a hypothetical scenario based on a story by
Moravec, 1988). Furthermore, in two of our studies we found a
link between Sexual Disgust and condemning mind upload,
which suggests that a biological component might be involved.
We also found consistent age effects (older people condemn mind
upload more than younger people), which together with our
Science Fiction Hobbyism Scale imply that cultural factors, such
as exposure to the ideas of consciousness transfer from young age
through books, films and pop culture is also an important factor.
In other words, familiarization with transhumanist themes
together with biological components related to disgust and purity
seem to play a significant role in determining whether people
condemn or approve of mind upload technology.
Moreover, we showed that the main object of condemnation is
the actual act of transferring one’s consciousness away from one’s
self (Study 1), since the experimental factors controlling for the
platform or the “target” of the transfer were all non-significant. In
Study 2, we ruled out death and disgust primes as possible
explanations for the results. The possible perceived death of the
scientist was controlled experimentally; and we further changed
the stimulus material not to include so-called 'body-envelope
violations', which, according to Rozin and colleagues (1999), are
salient disgust primes.
One of the more intriguing pieces of our results is the one that
relates to Death Anxiety. In Study 2 we controlled for individual
differences in death anxiety (Templer and Ruff, 1971) and suicide
condemnation (Renberg and Jacobsson, 2003; Arnautovska and
Grad, 2010), both of which—contrary to our initial expectations—
predicted higher approval of mind upload technology. It is quite
interesting that despite the scientist losing his actual physical body
in the vignettes, his actions were not perceived as dying or as being
suicidal. Throughout human history and cultures, there are myths
about fountains of youth and stories about becoming immortal. It
is noteworthy that these same motivations, dreams or intuitive
existential and moral concerns surface in postmodern technolo-
gical contexts. From this perspective, our findings link back to the
perennial questions driving our civilizations; the results do seem
reasonable since people who are anxious about death probably
find the idea of extending life, or even transcending death, com-
forting (O’Connell, 2017; Kurzweil, 1999, 2004).
To our knowledge, we have now for the first time empirically
shown that approval of mind upload technology aligns with the
hopes and wishes of central transhumanist advocates (O’Connell,
2017) who actually want to develop these technologies to achieve
immortality. Perhaps the preference towards attaining immor-
tality is even more widely shared than previously imagined; and if
this were the case, future mind upload technologies might be of
great interest to the general population. However, many questions
still remain unanswered, such as whether people view mind
upload as 'merely' life-extension or actual immortality, and
whether only those who want to be immortal approve of mind
upload. Further research is needed to answer these questions.
Across our studies, we found that pathogen disgust—when
measured both by the PVD (Duncan et al., 2009) and the TDDS
(Tybur et al., 2009)—was not associated with condemning mind
upload. However, sexual disgust was strongly associated with
condemnation of the mind upload, along with MFQ Purity,
which is a more abstract and indirect measure of disgust (Haidt
and Graham, 2007; Koleva et al., 2012). These findings resonate
with a recent study by Laakasuo et al. (2017), where sexual disgust
was strongly associated with deontological (as opposed to utili-
tarian) preferences in solving high conflict moral dilemmas.
Perhaps what is actually 'condemned' in the context of mind
upload is the act of 'instrumentalizing' or objectifying the human
consciousness or 'soul'; in deontological intuitions, condemnation
is typically related to objectifying humans or using them as
instruments. Sexual disgust might thus be, in an abstract sense,
related to condemnation of mind upload technology, because the
mind or “soul” is the “essence” of what it is to be a person (from a
folk psychological perspective). Furthermore, some of the items
used in the sexual disgust sub-scale describe acts and deeds that
objectify the person filling in the questionnaire (e.g.,'Finding out
that someone you do not like has sexual fantasies about you')—
the same cue that is related to deontological cognition and Kant’s
categorical imperative.
There are also interesting parallels between our current studies
and previous research showing women are more deontologically
oriented and more easily sexually disgusted than men (Tybur
et al., 2009; Laakasuo et al., 2017; Capraro and Sippel, 2017;
Fumagalli et al., 2010). Perhaps people with transhumanistic
leanings also find utilitarian approaches to moral dilemmas more
appealing than deontological ones. Thus, the gender differences
we observed could also be explained by general deontological
moral preferences; we think this would be an interesting direction
to take in future research.
Also the many null-findings in our studies are revealing. We
discovered that HEXACO, Schwartz’s Value Orientations, theory
of mind capacity, and rational intuition were not related to moral
condemnation of this technology. This implies that the effects of
disgust sensitivity and purity are not explained away by other
immediately 'obvious' factors (or 'usual suspects'), further
strengthening our results and interpretations.
Like all behavioral studies, ours suffers from a standard set of
limitations in laboratory or Internet questionnaires. Our
respondents were not a purely random sample representing the
general population. Instead, they were likely more curious and
open minded than the population average, having volunteered to
participate in scientific research. Our participants were also
younger than the Finnish population average. Nonetheless, by
also recruiting participants from a large public library—which
was the best location we could think of to obtain a representative
sample of the general population—we significantly mitigated the
above concerns. Survey-based studies utilizing self-report mea-
sures are also biased by a mixture of positive response biases and
demand characteristics. However, since our core results were
replicated across four studies (both online and off-line and in two
different cultures), this seems quite unlikely.
Another limitation in our studies relates to the representa-
tiveness of our samples. Across our studies our participants were
self-selected people, and our samples might have been biased
towards, for example, those people who were curious and/or
generally willing to contribute to science. Thus, the generalization
of our results is not clear and the findings need to be interpreted
with some caution. However, we note that this is an inherent
problem in any research involving human participants, and not
specific to our studies. Moreover, in most psychological research
the participants are generally young female students recruited in a
university campus—our methods for sampling participants are
arguably much more rigorous than merely using university stu-
dents as participants.
Across our statistical models, the best explanatory effect was
around 33%; this means that at best we were able to explain one
third of the variance in our dependent (response) variable.
Conversely, it means that two thirds of the variance was left
unexplained. While this may sound like a high amount, we note
that effect sizes of around 20–30% are considered very high in
psychological sciences—modeling human behavior, attitudes, and
individual differences is a very 'noisy' process.
Finally, in our studies we focused on one specific mind upload
technology, wherein the brain is destroyed as a consequence (a
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'Moravec transfer'; Moravec, 1988). This was a conscious meth-
odological decision to avoid issues related to multiple possible
simultaneous identities (Chalmers, 2010). There have been sug-
gestions in transhumanist literature that copying the brain
without destroying it might be possible. However, several authors
argue that any kind of physical body is only a temporary solution
and offers more limited opportunities for improvement and
adaptation than a 'substrate-independent mind', and thus a
destructive upload is preferable (for an overview of the theme see
International Journal of Machine Consciousness, Volume: 4,
Number: 1 [June 2012], Special Issue on Mind Uploading; and for
more specific argumentation, see Koene, 2012)
At the time of writing the most realistic techniques for map-
ping the human brain connectome require the brain to be cut into
thin slices for proper imaging (for example, see the startup
Nectome with plans to preserve brains in near future, so that they
can be uploaded when the necessary technology becomes avail-
able10). Regardless of how mind upload technologies actually
develop in the future, it is still important to understand people’s
perceptions and preferences concerning their use. Thus, different
descriptions of achieving mind transfer offer a fruitful line for
future research on human perceptions of postmodern technolo-
gies. Furthermore, as stated in the introduction, even if these
technologies do not become reality within the next 20 years, we
feel that the ethics and moral psychology regarding the implica-
tions of the technologies need to be discussed well in advance, due
to their obviously serious implications for human societies.
Digital technologies develop at exponential speeds, and given that
the first breakthroughs have already been made (a functional
copy of a rat’s sensory cortex has already been created), we should
be prepared to have a serious ethical discussion about the use of
these technologies sooner rather than later. At the moment the
EU is funding the development of these technologies with over 1
billion euros, and crucial advancements have already been made.
Future research should also look into the question of why
sexual disgust sensitivity and purity orientation predict negative
attitudes towards mind upload technology. Are these constructs
possibly associated with rejecting “human enhancement” tech-
nologies in general, and if so, why? The current results, alongside
those of Laakasuo et al. (2017) linking sexual disgust to deonto-
logical moral decisions, might suggest that moral cognition is a
product of sexual- instead of group selection (see also Miller,
2000, 2007); hence we should expect to find some meaningful
gender differences in future studies on moral cognition in post-
modern contexts. Jonathan Haidt, who is the main developer of
MFQ (Haidt and Graham, 2007; Koleva et al., 2012), has argued
on behalf of group-selection models in defense of his model
(Wilson, 2002; Haidt, 2006, 2007). If Haidt is correct, our data
hints at an evolutionary mechanism behind moral cognition that
combines both group-level and sexual selection mechanisms. This
by no means solves the puzzle; but we nonetheless argue for
including several disgust sensitivity measures in future research
dealing with moral issues in post-modern technological
environments.
Since mind upload technology has obvious theological impli-
cations (Hughes, 2007; Geraci, 2010), future studies should also
focus on cross-cultural and cross-religious comparisons. There
might be differences in attitudes and general approval between,
for example, Eastern (e.g., Buddhist, Hindu), and Western (e.g.,
Christianity) cultures and religions. Moreover, the Mormon
Transhumanist Association is one of the older advocates of mind
upload technology and both it and the Christian Transhumanist
Association claim growing memberships. This is interesting,
given that sexual disgust and moral purity orientation are linked
to more conservative religious and political positions, as well as
condemning mind upload, as we have shown. There are also
several other topics for future research, such as measuring indi-
vidual differences in preferences to become immortal across
cultures and religions; or even among users of psychedelic sub-
stances, which apparently reduce feelings of anxiety or stress
towards death (Dutta, 2012).
On a related note, our results are interestingly in line with
recent statements made by Leon Kass, who was one of the leading
figures on the U.S. President’s Council on bioethics. Kass con-
demned the use and development of transhumanist technologies
by and large based on his disgust reaction (O’Connell, 2017; Kass
called his reaction 'Wisdom of Repugnance'). This highlights the
major societal relevance of our studies by confirming the existing
prejudices. Moreover, our results extend the implications of these
prejudices by pinpointing their bio-cognitive origins to be in the
sexual disgust system and intuitions about purity norms, rather
than pathogen based or moral disgust.
Conclusions
In summary, we successfully showed that natural dualism—
people’s intuitive tendencies to separate mind from matter—is
relevant in modern day contexts where moral implications of new
technologies are being evaluated. Furthermore, we successfully
linked, in four studies, this condemnation tendency to factors
associated with disgust sensitivity (MFQ Purity and Sexual Dis-
gust). We found that Science Fiction Hobbyism, Death Anxiety
and Suicide Condemnation are linked to approval of mind
upload. We also successfully ruled out possible idiosyncrasies
associated with our stimulus materials, and eliminated multiple
alternative explanations common in the study of moral cognition
(Schwartz’s Values, HEXACO Personality Inventory, ToM, and
rational tendencies). Future studies in moral cognition should
look more carefully into associations between purity, sexual dis-
gust and adoption of new technologies. Our findings are highly
relevant also because they reflect the attitudes and reactions on
future technologies taking place on high governmental levels,
such as the U.S. President’s Council on Bioethics. Understanding
moral cognition in this context could be one of the most
important issues when it comes to guiding future norm-setting
with respect to new technologies.
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Notes
1 Naturally, ritualistic purity is not the only aspect of social life influencing one’s
afterlife fate in major Indian religions. There are, for example, many historical factors
that also influence individuals’ social obligations, but these are beyond the scope of
our current studies (Werner, 1988). However, the eightfold path in Buddhism
highlights the importance of living mindfully in a social setting today, here and now,
which is in line with our main argument: The fate of the soul is influenced by worldly










7 LessWrong is certainly not the only online community discussing these issues;
however, it is an open Internet community with strong transhumanistic leanings and
therefore is a window into the community of people who wish to discuss these
matters actively
8 Shenhav, Rand and Greene (2012) have found that intuitive thinking style and
religiosity are associated. We therefore also investigated if the REI Experientality
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Scale was associated with Religiosity also in our study, but found no evidence for it (r
= .04, p= n.s.) in our data.
9 Note that we have used unstandardized B-values throughout our manuscript. This is
due to ease of interpretation: our dependent variables, as well as most independent
variables, were consistently coded from 1 to 7. Unstandardized B-values can be
interepreted as follows: For every one unit increase in our independent (predictor)
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